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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for injuries to property arising
from faulty or defective sewer lines on plaintiff's
property.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A default judgment was entered against the defendant.
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside
the judgment.

From a denial of this motion by the district

court, defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the denial of the Motion
to Set Aside Default Judgment, and an Order permitting a
trial on the merits.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, the City of Tooele (hereafter City),
is a municipal coq:ioration organized and existing under the

laws of the State of Utah.

The plaintiff, Shiela F. Brande

!hereafter Brande), is a resident thereof.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On or about June 3, 1975, Brande informed the City
that her property was experiencing a sewer back-up,
apparently caused by an obstruction in the sewer lateral.
The City flushed the main sewer line near Brande's pro;ien
for the purpose of clearing any obstructions, but the
line was running freely.

Subsequently, the City

agai~

flushed the lines and found them to be free of obstructio:.;.
It concluded that the blockage must exist in the service
lateral from the main line to the Brande residence.

Althous'

the City made numerous efforts to locate this service
lateral, its agents could not locate it.
Brande then employed a private contractor to

exca~~

around the perimeter of the property until the lateral was
located.

By tracing it to the main line, the contractor

discovered a break in the lateral on plaintiff's property
several feet prior to the point where it connected to
City main.

t~

Plaintiff remedied the damage at this time.

On January 24, 1977, the Tooele City Mayor was sen~
with a summons and complaint in this cause of action.

Thes:

items were forwarded to the City Attorney for review.
By some mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.
these documents were filed with investigatory materials in
a city file, rather than being mailed to the City's insura::·
carrier.

No answer was immediately filed by the City beci;;

of this oversight, and the problem was not apparent untii
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March 4, 1977, when the City Attorney first received
notice that on February 17, 1977, Brande had taken a
def"!ult judgment against the City.
The default order was taken only 23 days after the
date of service of the complaint, with no prior notice
of tile action having been given to the City, either orally
or in writing, and no notice having been given to the
insurance carrier handling plaintiff's claim against the
City.
On March 17, 1977, the City filed a motion to set
aside the default judgment, only thirteen days after receiving notice of the court clerk's entry of the default
judgment.

From denial of this

mot~on,

defendant brought

this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WHERE THE CIRCU:.ISTANCES DID NOT
SUPPORT THE AVOIDANCE OF TRIAL ON A LEGAL
TECHNICALITY.
The failure of the City to file an answer within the
statutory twenty-day period after service of summons resul ted from mere mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect
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and not from an intentional wrongdoing.

According to

the affidavit filed in support of the Motion to Set Aside
Default, when the mayor of the City received a copy of the
summons and the complaint he forwarded them to the City
Attorney for his inspection.

The documents were then to

be sent on to the City's liability carrier so that the
carrier's attorneys could prepare and file an answer in
behalf of the City.

Due to a clerical or filing error w

some other inadvertence, the i terns were instead placed with :
investigatory

materi~ls

in a city file.

This mistake

d~

not become apparent until after the default judgment was
entered because the plaintiff did not contact the defendant
concerning the lack of an answer on file.

Without giving

notice of any kind, the plaintiff immediately moved for
default judgment within a matter of days after the statutor'
period had passed.

Had defendant been aware of the error,

an answer could have been routinely filed within the period
specified on the summons.
Based upon these facts, it is evident that neither t~
City nor its agents intentionally took any action to impede
the progress of the law suit, to hinder the fair and irnpar::
trial of the case on the merits, or to commit any other wr::c
going.

The record is devoid of any fact or circumstance

which justified the harsh position taken by the lower cou!'.
in refusing to vacate the default judgment.
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By not allowing the trial to proceed on its merits,
the district court failed to follow the guidelines
forth in numerous prior cases.

set

This Supreme Court has

consistently advised the lower courts to exercise caution
in ordering default judgments.
·.;~"::Jp{,17.

Es~2tes,

f.lc-"e::.;:

v.

.'fountain View

17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P. 2d 129 (1966).

They are not favored because they constitute a denial of
the litigant's opportunity to have a full and complete
hearing on the merits of the cause, contrary to fundamental
principles of our judicial process.

In this respect, their

effect is adverse to the interests of justice and fair
play.

Heathman v.

Fabian and Clendenin,

377 P. 2d 189 (1962).

14 Utah 2d 60,

For this reason, the reported cases

have quite uniformly regarded' as an abuse of discretion a
refusal to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to
act and timely application is made by the party in default
to set the judgment aside.
22 Utah 2d 284, 452 P.

Centr>:1Z

Finance

2d 316 (1969).

Co.

v.

Kynaston,

The district courts

must be indulgent toward pennitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled advisably and in
conformity with law and justice.

The "harsh and oppressive"

remedy of a default judgment should not be arbitrarily imposed.

Mayhew v.

Standar>d Gilsow~te Col"'lpany,

14 Utah 2d 52,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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376 P. 2d 951

(1962).

By failing to follow these guidelines, the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the
defendant to defend the claim in open court.

The court's

highly technical ai:iplication of Rule 55 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure does not advan,~e the interests of
justice or fair play and should not be condoned.
The real function of judgment by default is to clear
court calendars of cases where either litigant has indicate:,
disinterest in the process or outcome of adjudication.

In

justification of admission of service requirements, this
Court stated, in Locke v.

ne, :I'S".,

3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P. ::

1111 (1955) at 1112:
"It is undoubtedly true that this requirement is purposed to safeguard against entering the default of persons except where it
satisfactorily appears that they have consented thereto."
The defendant herein has never in any way consented to defi ..
judgment being entered against itself and in fact has strer:
ously objected to it ab initio.

Yet the plaintiff insists

on her "right" to the default judgment over the defendant's
objections.

Since the requirement for service is intended:

prevent unintentional defaults, the allowance of 20 days
for an answer must also be so intended.
are fictions in this regard.

Yet both provisic:'

A mere admission of service

and the passage of twenty days without an answer does ~t
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establish the defendant's consent to judgment against himself.

The 20-day period is merely an arbitrary limit beyond

which the defendant must be prepared to give a reasonable
account for his delay.

The defendant herein is so prepared.

To enforce the 20-day limit here, in the face of lack
of notice of the !lotion for Default Judgment and of defendant's
intense diligence upon discovery of the error, would indeed
be a "harsh and oppressive" result.

The 20-day limit is

concededly also intended to bring litigation to a speedy
conclusion.

Nevertheless,

justice sure, if not so swift,

must certainly be preferred over justice swift, but not so
sure.

To bind the defendant's entire defense on the merits

to its initial, unintentional and unperceived failure to
respond on time would be purely arbitrary.
Certainly, the delay involved here is dubiously small,
at most.

In Lock v.

Peterson,

su,~l'a,

at 1113, this court

pointed to its "declared policy that in case of uncertainty,
default judgments should be set aside to allow trial on
the merits."
~licy

This court first most fully expressed that

in the analogous case, Utah Commercial and Savings

E1nk v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 53 P. 1033 (1898), at 1036
where it stated:
"The power of the court to set aside judgments
by default is recognized and conferred in
section 3005, Rev. St. 1898, and should be
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liberally exercised, for the purpose of
directing proceedings and trying causes
upon their substantial Merits; and where
the circumstances which led to the default
are such as to cause the court to hesitate
it is better to resolve the doubt in favor'
of the application, so that a trial may be
secured on the merits."
Thus, it is clear that the "liberal" doctrine in questior.able cases is long-established in Utah law.
Commercial and Savi1~gs Ba>ck v.

T1•,,.·11bo,

In

:;~~

sz.pra, the defendant

believing that he had adequately retained counsel to represent him, left the state and did not become aware of his
default until three days after entry of judgment.

The cour:

relieved him of his default there, stating, at 1036:
" •.. courts do not favor judgments by default.
The policy of the law is that every man shall
be entered against him and where a judgment
by default has been entered, and within the
proper time, a good defense to the action to
which the judment was rendered is made to
appear, and it is shown that the default was
entered through excusable neglect or mistake,
the default will be vacated, and the judgment
set aside, to permit a trial on the merits.
It is true that ordinarily the setting aside
of a judgment by default rests within the
sound legal discretion of the court, and the
appellate court will not interfere, but where,
as in this case, it is made clearly to appear
that there was such an abuse of discretion,
through inadvertence or otherwise, as to rendu
the action erroneous and unlawful, the appellate
court will control such discretion, and set
aside the illegal action."
Since leaving the state in the mistaken belief t h a t counse:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had been retained was held sufficiently excusable in Utah

commercial Savings Bank v. Trumbo, supra, the mistaken
belief of the mayor, as nominal head of the defendant-city
herein, that the summons had been transmitted to the
defendant's insurer-counsel, is also sufficiently excusable.
The plaintiff here also did not have the excuse for not
notifying the defendant of the Motion for Default Judgment
that the plaintiff in Trumbo,

supra, had; the defendant-city

here did not leave the state.
Even in Utah Sand and Gravel Products Corporation v.

Tolbert, 16

Utah 2d 407, 402 P. 2d 703 (1965), where there

was a jurisdictionally defective copy of the summons, the
defendant's counsel at least had notice of the pendency of
some action.

Here the defendant's counsel had no notice

at all, and thus is completely innocent of even the slightest
inadvertence.

In Utah Sand and Grcvel Products Corporation

vs. Tolbert, supra, the court stated, at 705:
"It is in accordance with our rules, and
our decisional law, that where a default
has been taken against a party and there
is any justifiable excuse, the court should
be indulgent in setting aside the judgment
to afford him an opportunity for a trial on
merits, and any doubt about such a matter
should be resolved in favor of doing so."
While never having decided a case with facts quite like the
one at bar, this court should hold, in keeping with the tenor
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of the above decisions, that a minor, unperceived, inadvertent act of a clerical employee is a "justifiable excuse."
This case is at the other end of the spectrum from

Airkem Intermountain Inc., v.

Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.

429 (1973), wherein this court stated, at 431:
"The movant must show that he has used
due diligence and that he was prevented
from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control.·• [emphasis added]
There, the delay involved was intentional and of seven mont':
duration.

Here, on the other hand, the delay was minimal

and the "due diligence" of defendant's counsel was adequate.
Certainly the unwitting misdirection of the summons by a
clerical employee is one of those foreseeable circumstances
sufficient to pass the standard of Airkem Intermountain

In~

v. Parker, supra.
A holding that the inadvertence here is a "justifiable
excuse" would be consonant with decisions in other states.
In Montez v.

Tonkawa Village Apart"!ents, 215 Kan. 29, 523

P. 2d 351 (1974), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a
litigant should not be unnecessarily penalized for the
simple neglect of his agent which results in a default jud;·
ment.

There, the employee of the defendant that received

service inadvertently misplaced the papers, just as theY
were misplaced by an employee here.

In both cases, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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principal was in ignorance of the fact that nothing was
heing done about the suit.

One can easily imagine the de-

fendant herein in surprised dismay, echoing the words of
the defendant to his attorney in Utah Commerciat and Savings
Bank v. Trumbo,

supra, at 53 P. 1035:

attending to that ... case?"

In

'..'c- ~ez

"Haven't you been
v.

::-:;n:.:a·,;c:;:

'1-~:Zage

Apartments, supra, the court held that the error of the
employee was "excusable" to the defendant-employer, and,
therefore, held that the trial court's denial of motion to
vacate was an abuse of discretion.

The court stated, at

523 P. 2d 356:

"It may be observed that despite the wording
of the rule the federal courts will refuse
relief only where the neglect can be branded
as "inexcusable." Such terminology is closely
akin to our own phrase 'reckless indifference.'
.•. It implies somethin·g more than the unintentional inadvertence or neglect common to all
who share the ordinary frailties of mankind."
The latter is all that is involved here.
A few other cases concerning agents of the defendant
bear examination here.
field and Co.,

In 1-fooui, J;;c.

v. Ambrose and Rosen-

21 Ariz. App. 565, 521 P. 2d 1143 (1974), the

first process was served on an agent of the defendant who
did not inform the defendant or his counsel.

Upon the direct

receipt of a second summons, the counsel immediately responded.
T~ court there held the neglect to be "excusable," and it
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reopened the default judgment accordingly.

Marquez v.

Rapid Harvest Co.,

Similarly, ir.

99 Ariz. 363, 409 P. 2d 28S

(1965), the receiving agent for the defendant quit within
a few days after service without forwarding the summons.
The court there held that the neglect to answer caused by
that situation was "excusable," especially since the cour:
noted that no intervening rights had attached in reliana
upon the judgment.
The plaintiff herein will suffer no prejudice, either.
In B.D.M., Inc.

v. Sageco, Inc.,

529 P. 2d 1147 (Hawaii

1976), the court held that merely having to prove his case
in an adversary setting is not an element toward establish;::
"prejudice" to the non-defaulting party.

v.

Finally, in

ere"·

Caro, 114 CA 2d 35, 249 P. 2d 573 (1952), the defendants

gave the summons to their insurer, who assigned the case tc
an adjuster, who merely contacted the plaintiff's

attorn~.

and did nothing to officially answer the complaint.

The

court there held that the default should be set aside.
Another case concerning an insurance carrier is Phi:::

v. Findlay, 19 Ariz. App. 348, 507 P. 2d 687 (1973).

There

the insurer was not notified of the service on the defenda:.:·
insured.

The court held that this created excusable neglec:
.

' !l"

on the part of the defendant's counsel-insurer, suff1clL·

to reopen the default judgment against the defendant-insu:i
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Internal corporate confusion has also been held sufficient excuse for inaction in default.

Mead v. Citizen's

Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 78 Ida. 63, 297 P. 2d
1042 (1956).

Here, as in Mead,

the usual processing of

suit papers became temporarily confused, and thus should be
excused.
Similar to Kenned2 v.
543 P.

2d 937

.:.;21'

,~.,

218 Kan. 387,

(1975), the employee involved here had no

regular summons processing function.
~nnedy

;;1;;;.,

Therefore, as in

v. Meyer Co., Inc., supra, the mishandling of the

summons ought to be held an excusable neglect.
~Kennedy

The court

v. Meyer Co., Inc., supra, also held that defaults

obtained as a surprise to the defaulting party, such as is
the case here, ought to be vacated.
Good faith inaction on the part of the defendant, sincerely believing no further action on his part is required,
is consistently held to be excusable neglect.
Towers, 24 Cal. 2d 274, 148 P. 2d 611

Construction Co.

v.

Riskin v.

(1944); NomelZini

Deane, 160 CA 2d 57, 324 P. 2d 654 (1958);

Martin v. Rossi, 18 Ariz. App. 212, 501 P. 2d 53 (1972).

In

Mar>tin v. Rossi, supra, the court pointed out that the mistake need not be "completely explainable" to constitute
grounds to reopen a default judgment.

Here, the defendant

obviously believed that no more action was required on its
part.

Moreover, the failure of the summons to reach defendant's

=Junsel-insurer is not only completely explained, it is comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pletely understandable.
In Singleton v.

LePak,

425 P. 2d 974

(Okla. 1967), a

factor given importance by the court in reopening a defau:judgment was that the defendant acted with dispatch to
correct the error upon its discovery.

The defendant here::

also acted with utmost dispatch once the omission was uncovered.
Thus, by all standards applied by cases in other jum
dictions similar to the case at bar, the defendant's error
is an "excusable mistake"; and thus the default judgment
entered against him should have been vacated.
Tonkawa Village Apar>tmen ts,

As in Monte:

supr>a, the denial of defendant';

motion to vacate was an abuse of discretion.

POINT TWO
EQUITY DICTATES THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE
REQUIRED TO PROVE THE CASE ON ITS MERITS.
Although Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
purports to allow a default judgment to be entered in every
case where a party fails to plead or otherwise defend, it
is quite evident that this rule has as its primary purpose
the expeditious disposition of undisputed or stale claims.
In all reported cases where the failure to plead was based
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upon mere mistake or excusable neglect, the courts have
reinstated the party's right to trial on the merits, unless
he was grossly negligent and the opposing party was harmed
or pre]udiced in some manner by the failure to act.
This court stated in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v.

at 3 7 9:
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases
with dispatch and to move calendars with
expedition in order to keep them up to date.
But it is even more important to keep in
mind that the very reason for the existence
of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between
them.
In conformity with that principle the
courts generally tend to favor granting
relief from default judgments where there
is any reasonable excuse, unless it will
result in substantial prejudice or injustice
to the adverse party."
The mere necessity to go ahead with proof in an adversary setting is not a prejudice or injustice to the adverse
party in vacation of a default judgment.
Sageco,

Ina.,

B.D.lt.

Ina. v.

supra.

This interpretation of Rule 55 if exemplified by comparing two cases which reached contrasting results.
~yhew

In

v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P. 2d

951 (1962), the court set aside a default judgment where the
defendant had employed an attorney two days after the twentyday period for filing had passed and then asked leave to file
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his pleadings.

It appears that the original action was

brought against a financially distressed company which hac
no adequate or legally acting management.

In an

effort~

protect their rights, certain stockholders of this compan,·
attempted to form a reorganization committee and hired
attorneys to accomplish this end.

The attorneys asked lea·.·,

of court to file a late answer but the trial court refused
to grant the request.

On appeal, the Supreme Court set

aside the default judgment, labeling the default judgment
a "harsh and oppressive thing."

(476 P. 2d 953)

Noting

that the defendant's attorneys moved with dispatch to

~n

the defaults set aside, the court concluded that the late
filing was due to excusable neglect.
In contrast, the case of Master>a v.

LeEeuer>,

13 Utahl:

293, 373 P. 2d 573 (1962), is an illuminating example of wr.;
Rule 55 is necessary.

There the Supreme Court held as prW

the denial of a motion to set aisde a default judgment on
the grounds of inadvertence and excusable neglect where the
attorney representing the plaintiff contacted the defendant:
attorney several days before the default could be taken and
called his attention to the fact that a default would be
unless an answer was filed.

w

In addition, the plaintiff,~

elderly woman, had traveled from Seattle, lvashington, ton:
for the trial and presented an accounting at the default
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hearing; independent witnesses had been called; and there

was a possibility that the passage of time would increase
the damages.

Based upon all of these factors, the court

concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion.
In the present case, the facts concerning excusable
neglect of the defendant are sinilar to
ci:s.:ii;i"':e

C:J.71.ca.ny,

~2~~au

u.

14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 951

S~a.~3a.ri

(1962).

The

default was entered within four days after the statutory
period for filing had passed.

Within two weeks of the entry

of the judgment, defendant's counsel moved to have the judgment set aisde.

Thus, the failure to file was totally in-

advertent, and the defendant acted promptly and well within
the ninety day period allowed under Rule 60(b) to have the
default judgment set aside.

In contrast, there is no evidence

in the record that the failure to file harmed the plaintiff
~any

manner as illustrated in Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah

2d 293, 373 P.

2d 573 (1962).

The plaintiff, a local resi-

dent of the city, was seeking specified and constant damages
for an alleged prior breach of the city's duty to maintain
the sewer lines.

Furthermore, if plaintiff's counsel had

notified the city of its failure to timely file an answer,
this situation could have been easily avoided.

Although

Rule 55 does not require notice to be given after the entry
of the judgment, fairness and justice dictate that it should
be given before the default judgment is entered.

l

Reported
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cases constantly scrutinize the record to determine whethe:
prior notice was given.
v.

West,

(See Security Adjustment Bureau,

20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P. 2d 214

(1968).)

The purpose of a default judgment is to conclude litic,,
tion when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend
action.

a::

It was never meant to be used as a means for pumrl
I

ing a party for negligence or inadvertence of the party's
attorney.

McKean v. Mountain View Memo1'ial Estates, Inc.,

17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P. 2d 129 (1966).

Nor was it meant to

be used as a device where the plaintiff could avoid the bur·
den of proving her claim by resort to a technicality.

Just:

and equity demand that the City be allowed its day in cour:
The plaintiff will not be disadvantaged by being required
to prove her case on its merits.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requeste:
that the decision of the district court denying the settin~
aside of the default judgment be reversed and that the pla,:·
tiff be ordered to proceed to trial on the merits oft~~

Respectfully submitted,
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